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In 2016, the Federal Aviation Administration estimated that unmanned
aircraft would balloon to more than 7 million units by 2020 (FAA, 2016). A recent
census of users in the FAA’s UAS Registration Database totaled 836,577 as of
March 23, 2017, providing a rough barometer of domestic UAS market growth
(Larls, 2017).
Research Problem
The recent proliferation of small, commercially-available UAS systems has
resulted in a small but growing number of illicit activities involving this new
technology. Similarly, some UAS operations are taking place in proximity to
airports, critical infrastructure, national security areas, and other locations, sparking
security and safety concerns. Such incidents have ignited the growth of counterUAS businesses focused on keeping unmanned aircraft away from sensitive areas
and responding to unmanned aerial threats.
An Emerging Threat
At prisons throughout the United States, UAS platforms are being used to
illegally deliver illicit contraband to inmates inside. As early as 2013, Georgia law
enforcement personnel arrested four individuals who were planning to use an
unmanned aircraft to smuggle tobacco and cellular phones into a state prison (Craig,
Susso, & Shaffer, 2016). In 2015, officials in Ohio recorded three UAS incidents
at correctional facilities, all involving the delivery of narcotics (Craig, Susso, &
Shaffer, 2016). Similarly, Oklahoma correctional facilities recovered a crashed
UAS inside a state prison carrying hacksaw blades, cellular phone equipment, and
narcotics (Craig, Susso, & Shaffer, 2016). Department of Justice records obtained
by USA Today indicated more than a dozen documented incidents of drone
operators attempting to deliver contraband to U.S. prisons during an unreported
period (Abbasi, 2017).
A UAS was even suspected to have aided the escape of South Carolina
inmate, Jimmy Causey. South Carolina Department of Correction Director Bryan
Stirling, stated, “We also potentially believe that a drone was used to help him
[Causey] get the contraband in to escape” (Bolster & Rivera, 2017, p. 1).
According to Justin Long, a spokesman for the Bureau of Prisons, “The threat posed
by drones to induce contraband into prison and other means is increasing.”
(Rattigan, 2017, p. 1).
Border patrol and drug enforcement personnel have identified drones are
being used to facilitate narcotics smuggling over the U.S.-Mexican border. In 2015,

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018

1

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8

an unmanned aircraft carrying 6 pounds of crystal meth crashed in the border town
of Tijuana, apparently overloaded from its illicit cargo (Valencia & Martinez,
2015). According to Tijuana police, the drone used GPS to send the craft to a
particular, unnamed destination (Valencia & Martinez, 2015). It is estimated that
the cartels have used unmanned aircraft to smuggle narcotics at least 150 times per
year (Shields, 2017). Dinan (2018) highlighted the increasing frequency of
unmanned aircraft smuggling, noting a four-day period in November 2017 in which
border agents documented 13 separate incidents of drug-laden UAS crossings over
one section of the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition to suspected smuggling, drug
enforcement expert Sylvia Longmire stated, “the cartels have been using drones for
surveillance”—likely to monitor and circumvent law enforcement activities
(Valencia & Martinez, 2015, p. 1).
In addition to illicit activities, some UAS operations also create a public
hazard. The FAA has shown an interest in counter-UAS technology due to an
increasing number of unauthorized UAS operations being conducted in dangerous
proximity to airports. Using data collected between December 17, 2013, through
September 12, 2015, a study of UAS close encounters with manned aircraft
revealed that 58.8% of the 665 reported incidents containing distance data occurred
within 5 miles of an airport (Gettinger & Michel, 2015). An updated report
evaluating data from August 21, 2015, to January 31, 2016, revealed that 58.8% of
reported incidents containing distance data – the identical proportion from the
earlier study – occurred within 5 miles of an airport (Michel & Gettinger, 2016).
Unmanned aircraft are generally restricted from operating within 5 miles of an
airport without providing notification to the airport operator for recreational
operations conducted under 14 CFR 101 Subpart E, or without a 14 CFR 107.41
waiver for commercial UAS operations if the airport falls within airspace
categorized as B, C, D, or [surface class] E (Special Rule for Model Aircraft, 2016;
Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 2016).
In 2016, the Federal Aviation
Administration was directed by Congress via Public Law 114-190, to “establish a
pilot program for airspace hazard mitigation at airports and other critical
infrastructure using unmanned aircraft detection systems” (FAA Extension Safety
& Security Act of 2016, Sec. 2206). The agency subsequently partnered with
Nevada Institute for Autonomous Systems, Northern Plains Test Site, and Denver
International Airport to evaluate technologies for detecting intruding UAS
platforms operating near airports (Carey, 2016).
The full potential of UAS threats is still not fully understood and is an area
of emerging research. Wallace and Loffi (2015) attempt to codify a generic
taxonomy of currently known UAS threat categories. Just as new legitimate UAS
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applications are continuing to be explored, so too are illegitimate uses of unmanned
technology.
Counter UAS Overview
Counter-UAS technology can be facilitated using a wide variety of means,
but focuses on two distinct processes: detection and engagement. Detection
encompasses technology and processes necessary to detect, locate, track, and
identify an unmanned aircraft. Conversely, engagement involves technology and
actions to prevent, disrupt, disable, override, spoof [mislead], or otherwise interfere
with UAS operations. Engagement may also include active measures to forcefully
capture, inflict damage, or destroy the aerial vehicle. The distinction between these
processes is essential, as there are no legal ramifications for conducting UAS
detection, whereas significant legal hurdles exist to conducting engagement
(Rupprecht, 2017).
Existing Counter-UAS Restrictions
There are several legal impediments to utilizing counter-UAS technology.
The Communications Act of 1934 prohibits the use of unlicensed radio equipment
such as jammers or other devices that interfere with communication, such as the
UAS command link (Rupprecht, 2017). It is further prohibited to manufacture,
import, market, sell or operate jamming equipment in the U.S. under 47 CFR 2.803
(Rupprecht, 2017). Finally, 18 USC section 32 imposes imprisonment or fines
upon those that damage, disable, or destroy civil aircraft (Rupprecht, 2017).
Operators may also be subject to liability associated with tort claims arising from
the potential collateral damage, injury, or adverse effects of counter UAS activities
(Rupprecht, 2017). Such liability issues may include interference caused by
jamming equipment or damage or injury caused by the forced disabling of the
offending unmanned aircraft.
Easing Counter-UAS Restrictions
As errant UAS operations continue relatively unabated, Congress has taken
notice. In 2016, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act of 2017.
In Sec. 1697, Congress codified new authority for military leaders to mitigate UAS
threats. The statute gave relatively broad powers for the armed forces to disrupt
control, intercept, seize, disable, damage, and destroy offending aircraft
(Rupprecht, 2017; National Defense Authorization Act of 2017).
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Rise of Commercial Counter-UAS
The security risk posed by unmanned aircraft has not gone unnoticed by
commercial entities either. Stadiums and other open-air public gatherings are
recognizing the need for counter-UAS activities. On November 28, 2017, Tracy
Mapes was arrested after flying a small UAS over NFL game at both the Levi
Stadium and Oakland Coliseum two days earlier (Gomez & Salonga, 2017). The
unmanned aircraft allegedly dropped leaflets over the stands at Levi Stadium. After
reviewing surveillance footage of the initial incident, law enforcement personnel
anticipated the alleged perpetrator would try the same activity at the nearby
Oakland Coliseum. Santa Clara Police Lt. Dan Moreno highlighted the risk of UAS
operations over the crowded areas stating, "A drone can lose control and injure
someone in the crowd or drop material that may be harmful. We are evaluating our
security practices with state and federal authorities to make sure this doesn't happen
again." (Gomez & Salonga, 2017, p. 1).
Purpose
While information is available about countermeasure technology, very little
information exists about the methods used to conduct counter-UAS operations. The
purpose of this study is to develop a better understanding of countermeasure tactics,
techniques, procedures, and lessons learned.
Research Objectives
Researchers sought to discover information to fulfill the following research
objectives:
1. Describe counter-UAS mission planning considerations.
2. Identify key tasks associated with a counter-UAS engagement.
3. Identify problems, unanticipated conditions, or lessons learned
associated with counter-UAS operations.
Method
The authors employed an exploratory research approach with a critical
paradigm. According to Creswell and Miller (2000), the critical paradigm “holds
that researchers should uncover the hidden assumptions about how narrative
accounts are constructed, read, and interpreted.” (p. 126).
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Authors interviewed a commercial, counter-UAS organization highlighting
a specific, past counter-UAS event. An unstructured interview was used to generate
qualitative, descriptive data to address the research objectives. While the majority
of the interview was conducted using open-ended questions, the interviewer
periodically asked targeted, clarifying questions to ensure accuracy and conceptual
understanding.
By qualitative procedures recommended by Creswell and Miller (2000), the
authors utilized researcher reflexivity, collaboration, and peer debriefing to
maintain study validity. Researcher reflexivity involves the self-disclosure of
personal assumptions and biases. Further, the authors closely collaborated with
participants as co-researchers when constructing the narratives and perspectives to
ensure the accuracy. Additionally, the author's employed member checking to
validate complex or technical information. According to Creswell and Miller
(2000), member checking involves “taking data and interpretations back to the
participants in the study so they can confirm the credibility of the information and
narrative account” (p. 127). Finally, the authors sought the peer review of several
UAS and security experts to assess study methodology, assumptions, and data
interpretation.
Assumptions & Limitations
The following limitations and researcher assumptions applied to this
project:
1. Procedures utilized by counter-UAS organizations may vary widely,
and the approach used by the interviewed organization was unlikely
to be representative of all such organizations.
2. The participants provided an accurate account of their experiences
associated with the counter-UAS operation.
3. Depending on the counter-UAS event locale, both UAS and counterUAS rules and regulations may not be universally applicable.
4. The researcher was unable to record the interview due to proprietary
and security concerns. Instead, the interviewer took digital notes of
key data points, which were assumed to be accurate.
5. The researcher was required to sign a non-disclosure agreement with
the participant organization, to withhold specific proprietary or
security-sensitive data. The participants agreed to provide a candid
interview, which included discussion of specific unclassified,
security-sensitive material to enhance researcher perspective. The
participants reviewed the paper before publication and were

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018

5

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 2, Art. 8

permitted to strike proprietary or security-sensitive text. When
applicable, the researcher replaced deleted security-sensitive text
with generic descriptions of the type of information withheld.
6. Technical details and specifications regarding detection and
mitigation equipment were withheld for security and proprietary
reasons.
Researcher Reflexivity
The primary researcher was not a research subject. The primary researcher
does not have direct operational expertise with counter-UAS functions, however,
has related military expertise in detection technologies. The primary researcher is
seasoned in performing qualitative research related to aviation security issues,
including UAS security. The researcher supports the use of counter-UAS means as
a mechanism to deter, actively restrict, or mitigate unauthorized UAS operations
that pose a security or safety hazard. The primary researcher further supports the
enforcement of UAS restrictions and regulations via means that include the
interruption, damage, destruction or seizure of a UAS in exigent circumstances of
compromised safety or security caused by the UAS operator.
The secondary researcher was not a research subject. The secondary
researcher does not have operational expertise with counter-UAS functions,
however, has ancillary experience as an advisor for counter-UAS research projects.
The secondary researcher is also seasoned in performing qualitative research. This
researcher believes that counter-UAS is “much needed” and “woefully behind
development.” This researcher sees strong demand for counter-UAS activities to
support border security, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism. Further, this
researcher advocates for counter-UAS employment for large stadiums, high
population public events, domestic security, and select law enforcement functions.
The tertiary researchers simultaneously served as both research subjects and
research collaborators. These individuals have operational experience in
performing counter-UAS functions in varied environments. The researchers
actively participated in the FAA’s PATHFINDER program. The PATHFINDER
program is designed to facilitate “incremental expansion of UAS operations into
the NAS” by focusing on visual line of sight over people, extended visual line of
sight over rural areas, and beyond visual line of sight in rural or isolated areas
(FAA, 2016, p. 1). These researchers performed five counter-UAS demonstrations
to various organizations, including the U.S. Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard, Secret Service, as well as a myriad of private companies. Further, these
researchers conducted two operational counter-UAS missions—one international

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1224

6

Wallace et al.: Exploring Commercial Counter-UAS Operations: A Case Study

mission included UAS mitigation, with a second domestic mission limited to
detection and reporting. These researchers proactively support unmanned aircraft
operations for a variety of practical functions, including security. Conversely, these
researchers recognize the need for providing protection against unauthorized or
hazardous UAS activities. These researchers espouse the need for counter-UAS
development as a basis for UAS detection system evolution and preservation of
safety in the BVLOS environment.
Results
An interview was arranged with the CEO, Chief Security Officer, and Chief
Pilot from Intelligent Drone Systems (IDS), a Florida-based company specializing
in unmanned systems and counter-UAS technology. The interview focused on
counter-UAS activities conducted in support of the Dominican Music Festival
Presidente conducted from November 3-5, 2017 in the Felix Sanchez Olympic
Stadium, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.
Objective
Intelligent Drone Systems was contracted to furnish a specific security
detail to conduct 72 hours of UAS detection and counter-UAS services in support
of the Festival Presidente beginning on November 3, 2017, at 0800L. IDS was
explicitly charged with enforcing a UAS-free zone in proximity to the performance
stage contained within the main stadium and surrounding area out to 1 km [specific
contract details withheld]. Figure 1 displays an approximation of team’s operations
area. The IDS team maintained responsibility for identifying unauthorized UAS in
proximity to the exclusion area, tracking UAS craft, locating offending UAS pilots,
and engaging UAS craft violating the exclusion area.
Planning
Pre-coordination was conducted with the Dominican Institute of Civil
Aviation (IDAC), the Dominican Republic National Police, the Ministry of
Defense, Cerveceria Nacional Dominicana (CND) [entertainment contractor], and
event security service.
A site survey was conducted before the event to determine likely launch
areas for possible intruding UAS platforms. The survey included an overview of
the surrounding topography. The team determined that athletic fields immediately
east of the stadium were most likely to be the launch site and ingress direction for
unauthorized UAS flights. The team focused counter-UAS detection and
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directional countermeasures to respond to threats primarily from that area. High
rise buildings to the west and north were determined to be unlikely ingress routes
for UAS threats due to urban obstructions, the lack of open space to launch a UAS
platform, and limited visual line of sight.

Figure 1. Felix Sanchez Olympic Stadium, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. IDS counter-UAS
Area of Responsibility identified by red shading, extending 1 km from stadium. (Google
Maps/Satellite Overlay)

Complicating the planning process, IDS was also required to coordinate and
manage various UAS flights conducted by authorized vendors at the event. IDS
personnel coordinated with event planners to establish a white list of authorized
UAS flights, and documented planned UAS operations via a generic flight plan.
IDS was required to monitor and ensure authorized flights complied with their
flight plans and were conducted safely. IDS established takeoff and landing
protocols for authorized flights, which required operators to pre-coordinate with
IDS operators via a digital communications channel 30 minutes prior to scheduled
launch, again just before takeoff, and immediately after landing. Initially, two
companies were authorized to fly unmanned aircraft during the event.
The IDS team confirmed that IDAC had issued a Temporary Flight
Restriction (TFR) for the event and coordinated with CND planners to post
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numerous messages to UAS forums and social media sites advising UAS operators
of flight restrictions surrounding the event and advising them to avoid the area.
Deployment
IDS deployed three members to support this operation. The detection and
engagement system operator (DESO) led the IDS team from within the confines of
the event operations center and coordinated with event operations staff. A second
team member was deployed at an elevated vantage point within the stadium as an
overwatch observer to aid in UAS visual detection. The third team member was a
mobile liaison and deployed in conjunction with event security personnel to locate
and make contact with unauthorized UAS operators.
To aid in early UAS and UAS operator detection as well as enhance overall
situational awareness, the IDS team was prepared to deploy a tethered, rotary-wing
UAS to provide high-angle observation. While procedures were in place to make
use of tethered UAS information as needed, the team did not employ this device
during the 72-hour mission execution period. The team explained that the tethered
UAS was not determined to be needed during the employment period.
Communication
The team utilized two primary communication mediums.
Voice
communication was conducted using Zello, a push-to-talk (PTT) radio application
designed for smartphones, tablets, and laptop computers. The application requires
internet connectivity, either via Wi-Fi or cellular phone network. The application
has a slight latency, with the voice message being delivered to the recipient after
the sender releases the PTT button. The application also features user-defined
channels, which can also be used to share photos, playback messages, and post to
social media.
Sharing of text information was performed via WhatsApp, a digital instant
messaging service for VoIP, video calls, images, documents, media, and user
location that can be used on a mobile phone or computer. IDS established multiple
WhatsApp channels for various functions, including authorized UAS operators,
security operations channel for IDS personnel, and a master channel for liaising
with event planners and security staff.
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Counter-UAS Detection & Engagement System
The team utilized multiple radio frequency (RF) detectors and control signal
interruption devices operated from a laptop computer in the event operations center
[device manufacturer and model withheld]. The RF detection system was designed
to: identify the presence of UAS communication signal parametrics, triangulate the
approximate position of the UAS, and automatically display detection information
on the user interface. The detection and engagement system operator could choose
to monitor the UAS activity in real time or execute an electronic countermeasure
that would override the communication links between the remote pilot and UAS.
Depending on the UAS type and firmware, the link interruption would cause the
UAS to return-to-home—its launch point--or immediately discontinue flight.
In addition to responsive interruption as detailed above, the RF system
allowed for the creation of a digital geofence restricted zone that could prevent
unmanned aircraft from taking off, entering a defined area, or following the remote
pilot’s instructions while inside the area. The effectiveness of the geofence zone
was limited if the unauthorized UAS were not within initial line-of-sight of one of
the four RF countermeasure system transmitters. For this event, a geofence
restricted zone was established within a 5 km radius of the stadium and up to 500ft
AGL. Due to the potential risks of a UAS falling abruptly and causing injury or
property damage, the geofence was configured for automatic-detection and
notification only. Each countermeasure was employed manually, in coordination
with security, overwatch and with prior authorization from the IDAC liaison or
event Chief Security Officer.
Four integrated detection sensors/interruption transmitters were initially
planned for deployment, one in each of four cardinal directions from the stadium.
One detector was damaged prior to mission execution due to intermittent power
availability. As a result, the team was forced to remove sensor coverage from the
southern sector.
The RF system was the only active UAS countermeasure system used
during the mission. The IDS team did not plan to utilize any form of kinetic
engagement to disable unmanned aircraft in the event the RF countermeasure
system was ineffective. In the unlikely event, the countermeasure system was
ineffective at disabling an unauthorized UAS, the IDS team would report
information about the offending UAS and defer action to the event’s Chief Security
Officer and IDAC liaison.
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Engagement Cycle
IDS personnel established an identification matrix to determine the identity,
location, status, and disposition of detected UAS platforms. An overview of the
identification matrix is presented in Figure 2. Upon initial detection, the detection
and engagement system operator would verify that the UAS operation was not an
authorized operation by comparing the parameters against authorized flight plans
and coordinated with authorized UAS pilots via WhatsApp.
If the operation was determined to be unauthorized, the detection and
engagement system operator reported the cardinal direction of the unknown UAS
to the overwatch observer via Zello for visual confirmation and tracking. The
mobile liaison was deployed via Zello in conjunction with an event security officer
to locate the UAS and UAS operator, receiving supplemental location updates from
the overwatch observer. Once the overwatch observer visually located the intruding
UAS, he would determine if the craft was within the authorized engagement zone
of 1 km from the event site. Additionally, he would perform a visual risk
assessment of the ground area below the UAS to determine if the device could be
safely disabled without causing injury to people or damage to unprotected
structures or property. If the overwatch observer deemed the engagement safe, he
would report his findings to the DESO. The DESO would then coordinate with the
IDAC or event Chief Security Officer on duty to obtain permission to electronically
disable the intruding UAS. If approved, the mobile liaison and accompanying event
security officer would proceed to the UAS location to investigate the crash site and
secure the unmanned vehicle [if UAS discontinued flight], or follow the UAS back
to its launch location [if the UAS returned-to-home]. If the pilot was located, the
mobile liaison deferred further action to the event security officer, who had the
discretion to arrange an arrest or expel the operator from the event.
Engagement Results
During the contract period, the IDS team detected 23 total UAS events in
the exclusion area. Of the 23 events, 15 were unauthorized. Three unauthorized
incursions occurred during daylight hours, one incursion occurred during local civil
twilight, and 11 incursions occurred at night.
The team responded to all 15 unauthorized events. The IDS team leveraged
geofence notifications four times and employed countermeasures preventing or
limiting exclusion zone incursions. Electronic counter-measures (ECM)
interrupting pilot UAS control was employed during eight incursions. No action
was taken during two of the events since the UAS crashed during one event, and
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the UAS was unable to be visually located during the second. Event security was
dispatched during one event, and an authorized pilot was erroneously detained, with
the offending unauthorized pilot escaping backstage before security could
intervene. Two unmanned aircraft were confiscated during the event. The
confiscated platforms were both DJI products and included Phantom and Mavic
models.

Figure 2. Intruder UAS identification and decision matrix.
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Eight authorized UAS flights were conducted by two companies. One
authorized pilot was de-certified for flight after deviating from an established flight
plan, failing to coordinate launch with IDS personnel, and performing a flight over
the gathered crowd within the exclusion zone on November 3. An overview of
incursion and countermeasure employment activity is contained in Figure 3.
Details and engagement notes are contained in Appendix 1. A visual depiction of
a visually-spotted UAS are displayed in Figures 4 and 5.

Figure 3. UAS activity locations, November 3-5, 2017. (Google Maps/Satellite Overlay)
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Figure 4. Intruding, daylight UAS flight; spotter facing southeast.
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Figure 5. Authorized nighttime UAS flight; spotter facing east-southeast.

Discussion
As evidenced by the multiple lessons learned, it is clear that the commercial
counter-UAS field is still very much evolving to discover the best tactics,
techniques, and procedures to employ against UAS threats.
During this event, the IDS team solely employed an RF countermeasure
system, which proved effective against the intruding, consumer-grade UAS
platforms. It is unknown based on the collected data how the RF countermeasure
system would have fared against a homebuilt UAS. In this particular case, it is
highly likely that the preponderance of UAS intruders were hobbyists, interested in
capturing video of the noted, national event. Based on the reported UAS incidents,
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it seems unlikely that any of the platforms were being used maliciously to carry out
criminal activities or cause substantial harm.
Describe counter-UAS mission planning considerations
The IDS team highlighted the importance of the mission planning process
when preparing to conduct counter-UAS activities. Based on the provided data,
researchers suggest that the following considerations be taken into account when
performing counter-UAS operations:
Identify Mission Objectives:

Site Survey:

Observation Point Selection:

C-UAS Equipment Deployment:

Probable Threat Assessment & Taxonomy:

Risk Assessment/Risk Tolerance:

Identification Matrix Development:

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss2/8
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Determine primary mission objectives such as
area or target to be protected, duration, and
other requirements.
Conduct site survey to determine likely areas
of UAS launch, ingress, & egress routes.
Correlate site locations with established
NOTAMS/TFRs, etc. Determine areas where
UAS-disabling mitigation strategies would be
hazardous (areas of vehicular traffic, crowded
areas, etc).
Determine areas of best visibility for UAS
visual detection. Consider sun positioning,
background contrast, and lighting. Establish
visual landmark references & determine the
distance to aid in threat distance estimation and
coordination.
Determine line of sight for RF detection &
interruption equipment. Determine equipment
deployment limitations, based on logistical
requirements (availability of electricity,
control cord length, communications coverage,
etc.). Identify likely coverage gaps based on
equipment capabilities & effectiveness.
Identify possible threat platforms based on
probable threat intent (attack, video recording,
hobbyist flight, etc), consumer availability,
prior encounter experience, local knowledge,
environmental favorability (i.e. open areas are
favorable to fixed-wing UAS, whereas
obstacle-dense areas are not).
Determine risk tolerance to protected target.
Codify measurable criteria to determine risk
elevation (standoff distance, UAS type, size,
speed, etc). Establish risk assessment matrix.
Determine means to identify authorized vs.
unauthorized UAS flights. Integrate elevated
response matrix triggers based on risk
tolerance and risk assessment.
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Mitigation Selection:

Determine primary (and if applicable)
secondary or tertiary mitigation mechanisms
for UAS threats. Ensure appropriateness and
effectiveness of mitigation strategies to
anticipated threats.
Determine how the
employment of various mitigations will be
determined. Determine engagement authority
and coordination requirements, if required.
Communications Plan:
Identify
communications
requirements
modalities and limitations. Establish primary
(and secondary) means of communication.
Codify coordination plan for authorized UAS
flights. Articulate communications purpose
and information flow. (should be responsive to
who, what, where, when why, how
communication should occur)
Coordination Plan:
Identify how C-UAS activities integrate into
overall security plan. Describe capabilities
response plan to decision-making authorities
and
other
stakeholders.
Determine
coordination requirements.
Social Media & Public Information:
Identify means of public information
dissemination, including the applicability of
TFRs, NOTAMS, etc. Identify how
information will be disseminated and how
communications modalities will be monitored
and responsive to public inquiry.
Figure 6. Proposed counter-UAS mission planning tasks. The authors acknowledge that the
planning task list does not address every conceivable task associated with counter-UAS operations,
but rather captures and codifies key planning elements represented in the collected interview data.

Identify key tasks associated with a counter-UAS engagement
Based on perceptions provided by the research participants, the authors
codified a proposed model for key tasks associated with counter-UAS engagement.
This model contained in Figure 7 can be used by commercial counter-UAS
organizations to facilitate threat mitigation in a concerted, safe, and systematic
manner.
Detection:
Track:
Threat Assessment:
Search:
Identification:
Evaluate:
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Detect unauthorized UAS operation.
Fix location, speed, course, altitude and track visually or via other
means.
Confirm regulatory or airspace violation and threat potential of UAS
system.
Conduct hasty search for UAS operator; if found, communicate
requirement to disengage activities and land UAS.
Determine identification of brand/model of UAS [if possible].
Evaluate UAS brand/model vulnerabilities
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Selection:
Situational Analysis:
Risk Assessment:

Decision:
Engagement:
Effectiveness:

Disengagement:
Locate:
Examine:
Respond:
Investigation:
Secure:
Enforce:
Document:
Report:
Reconstitute:

Determine appropriate countermeasure/mitigation system to engage
UAS.
Evaluate situation and environment to determine hazards or potential
collision effects of engagement.
Determine risk level associated with performing an engagement.
Balance engagement decision based on measured risk and likely
collateral effects.
Make engagement decision.
Perform engagement.
Determine effectiveness of countermeasure/engagement strategy.
Confirm if UAS threat has been neutralized or disabled. If ineffective,
return to Evaluate step.
Discontinue employment of countermeasure system.
Locate UAS platform or wreckage.
Examine UAS for collateral threats or effects (i.e. attached IED,
CBRNE, HAZMAT, fire, etc).
Respond to collateral threats or effects.
Collect applicable evidence, including scene photos, UAS identifying
markings, testimony of witnesses or other relevant information.
Secure the UAS platform, as appropriate.
Locate and report/coordinate detainment/citation/trespass offending
individual, as appropriate.
Document threat, circumstances, engagement, results, and
investigation findings.
File applicable reports with appropriate agency or jurisdictional
authority.
Reequip for subsequent response or engagement, as required.

Figure 7. Proposed engagement model for counter-UAS actions. Note: This recommended
engagement matrix provides a holistic approach to counter-UAS response. This model represents a
long-chain decision-making process whereby risk level is relatively low and the responders do not
hold indigenous engagement authority. The authors acknowledge that there may be good
justification to hasten or even skip certain steps, based on situational conditions, the relative severity
of the threat, and timeliness of response.

Identify problems, unanticipated conditions, or lessons learned associated
with counter-UAS operations
The IDS team reported that access to reliable electrical power presented a
challenge for the operation. Intermittent power to the RF detectors/control signal
interruption device caused significant damage to one of the four deployed devices,
requiring equipment repair and replacement that could not be performed in the field.
This setback required the IDS team to prioritize countermeasure coverage, focusing
on vectors of likely UAS incursions. The team stated that robust surge protectors
will be included in their future deployment kit to prevent damage to sensitive
computer and countermeasure equipment. Moreover, the loss of equipment
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underscores the importance of having reliable equipment redundancy or viable
alternatives available.
Additionally, interrupted or unreliable WI-FI coverage limited the team’s
ability to perform digital updates to the RF detection/control system. Additionally,
the lack of reliable WI-FI coverage also forced the team to rely more heavily on
cellular phone data for communications and other internet needs. The team plans to
acquire alternative communication means that can serve as a backup in the event of
limited or interrupted wireless internet connectivity.
The IDS over watch experienced intermittent difficulty visually locating
UAS platforms—particularly at night. See Figure 5. During most night UAS
encounters, UAS platforms were well illuminated by integrated position lighting,
however, on at least one occasion these lights were intentionally obscured or
disabled by the operator, likely to avoid visual detection. As a result, the IDS team
plans to acquire a monocular night vision device to aid the overwatch observer in
spotting unlighted UAS craft. Additionally, the team also plans to include
traditional binoculars in its future deployment kit to augment daytime visual
detection. Moreover, there may be cause to suggest the need for additional
manpower allocation to this critical function to put “more eyes on more sky.”
During the event, the RF countermeasure device was accused of causing
interference with the event’s ticket scanners. However, this interference was never
validated. The team suggested that in the future, further efforts will be given to
identifying potential collateral EM spectrum interference problems.
The team stated that additional onsite preparation time would have been
helpful. The team explained that further coordination with authorized pilots could
have streamlined the flight authorization process.
Finally, the team highlighted the importance and effectiveness of social
media engagement. The entertainment contractor’s prominent social media
presence and advisory message postings advising UAS operators to remain clear of
the venue played a significant role in deterring unauthorized UAS activity.
Conclusions
As the literature review suggests, unmanned threats are continuing to evolve
in application, scope, and complexity. In January 2018, the Russian military
reported a swarm attack of crudely-designed, weaponized unmanned aircraft on two
of its bases in Syria (Daniels, 2018). Reportedly, Russian air defenses detected 13
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“small size air targets” inbound to its bases and successfully engaged them with
anti-aircraft and electronic-countermeasures (Daniels, 2018, p. 1). As cited in
Daniels (2018), political scientist and terrorism expert Colin Clarke underscored
the attack as a wakeup call, urging:
The U.S. and other nations have a lot of thinking to do about how to
deal with the weaponized drone technology because it could be used
not just on the battlefield but potentially in urban areas by organized
terrorist groups and other bad actors (p. 1).
The overall lack of available literature calls attention to the need to develop
further and refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for countering UAS threats.
The preponderance of unanticipated setbacks and lessons learned derived from the
presented case study suggests that adequate best practices are still very much in the
infancy of development. The findings of this study should not be interpreted as
conclusive, but rather as a basis of deviation for additional research, exploration,
and discussion.
Although not directly studied, participant comments suggested that existing
legal and regulatory roadblocks preventing the use of active, counter-UAS
mitigation measures in the U.S. may discourage counter-UAS development and
place the country at a disadvantage in effecting UAS security. While political
leaders have made recent positive steps to rectify this deficiency through more
permissible legislation, the remaining legal hurdles are likely to continue curtailing
counter-UAS development.
This research project codifies merely one approach to effecting counterUAS operations. No doubt, there are many more viable and perhaps more effective
means of mitigating unmanned aircraft threats. Perhaps the most important
conclusion that can be gleaned from this study is the glaring need for additional
research in this highly fluid, evolving field.
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Appendix 1
Summary of UAS Activity, Response, & Disposition

DTG

Status

Response

Disposition

031755

Unauthorized

None

UAS detected & crashed

032020

Authorized

None

N/A

032049

Authorized

Pilot Grounded

032154

Unauthorized

Geofence

032256

Unauthorized

ECM

030022

Unauthorized

Geofence

030216

Unauthorized

Geofence

Authorized pilot deviation from
flight plan
Unable to employ countermeasures
due to crowd proximity; performed
GPS Jamming; UAS RTH; Tracked
back to operator
UAS landed 200’ outside stadium;
Notified security
UAS RTH; operator located outside
perimeter
UAS RTH

041211

Unauthorized

None

UAS detected; unable to rectify

041755

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew; duration 15 mins

041939

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew; duration 10 mins

041952

Unauthorized

ECM

042005

Unauthorized

ECM

042012

Unauthorized

ECM

042016

Unauthorized

ECM

042053

Authorized

None

UAS detected; no visual contact;
Presumed unable to initiate launch
UAS detected; visually spotted
flying low over crowd; ECM
initiated; landed 1800’ west of
stadium
UAS detected; visually spotted high
altitude flight pattern; ECM
initiated; RTH westbound
UAS detected; visually spotted UAS
launch from VIP tower; descended
near stage; UAS secured by spotter/
ID’d operator; referred to security
TV UAS crew; duration 11 mins

042122

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew

042145

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew

042212

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew
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DTG

Status

Response

Disposition

042237

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew

042348

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew

051656

Authorized

None

TV UAS crew; duration 28 mins

051744

Unauthorized

ECM

051808

Unauthorized

ECM

051927

Authorized

None

UAS detected; visually spotted 2 mi
east of stadium; ECM initiated;
uncontrolled
descent;
security
unable to locate
UAS visually spotted 1 mi west of
backstage; ECM initiated; UAS
crash landed outside perimeter
TV UAS crew; duration 16 mins

051959

Unauthorized

Geofence

052112

Authorized

None

052322

Unauthorized

ECM

052328

Unauthorized

Security
dispatched
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4x UAS detected; UAS platforms
RTH
TV UAS crew
UAS spotted by TV crew; authorized
UAS landed; ECM initiated; landed
outside northeast stadium
Erroneously detained authorized
UAS
operator;
unauthorized
operator recovered downed UAS and
escaped backstage
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